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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of localizing the
sensors’ positions in presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
We consider a general attack model, in which the attacker action
is only constrained through the frequency and duration of DoS
attacks. We propose a distributed iterative localization algo-
rithm with an abandonment strategy based on the barycentric
coordinate of a sensor with respect to its neighbors, which is
computed through relative distance measurements. In particular,
if a sensor’s communication links for receiving its neighbors’
information lose packets due to DoS attacks, then the sensor
abandons the location estimation. When the attacker launches
DoS attacks, the AS-DILOC algorithm is proved theoretically to
be able to accurately locate the sensors regardless of the attack
strategy at each time. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm
is demonstrated through simulation examples.
Index Terms—Localization, Sensor networks, Denial-of-service
attacks, Distributed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
LOCALIZATION, which is a fundamental problem inwireless sensor networks, has attracted extensive atten-
tion in the past few decades. In some networks with central-
ized information structures, such as agricultural monitoring
networks and road traffic monitoring networks, it is very
convenient to use centralized localization method because the
measurement data of all nodes in the network are collected
in a central processor [1], [2]. However, as described in
[3], the centralized method is usually not suitable for large-
scale sensor networks, and it requires higher computational
complexity and lower reliability than the distributed method
due to the accumulated information loss caused by the multi
hop transmissions on the wireless network.
In 2009, Khan et al. [4] proposed a distributed iterative
localization (DILOC) algorithm based on barycentric coordi-
nates representation, where there are anchors, i.e., the nodes
with known accurate locations, and sensors to be localized.
The remarkable feature of the DILOC algorithm is that the
sensor localization is represented by an iterative process with
matrix-vector form through relative distance measurements. It
has been proved that the DILOC algorithm can converge to the
exact locations of sensors. Based on the framework of DILOC,
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the localization problem in different scenarios have been
studied. In [5], the DILOC algorithm was utilized to achieve
precise localization in a noisy environment. Deghat et al. [6]
established an algebraic condition for the DILOC algorithm to
achieve global convergence in a finite-time horizon. The global
convergence with measurement noise and local convergence
with least squares solutions of the DILOC algorithm were
analyzed in [7]. Based on three types of hybrid measurements,
including distance, azimuth and relative position, Lin et al.
[8] presented a necessary and sufficient graphic condition for
sensor localization. In addition, the reference [9] proposed
a more general iterative form for the DILOC algorithm by
adding a gain parameter based on consensus of multi-agent
systems (e.g., see [10], [11]). This consensus-based iterative
form includes the iterative form in [4] as a special case.
Network security issues have gradually become the focus
of public attention [12]–[14]. In recent years, various cyber
attacks have appeared with different purposes. A common
type of network attack is called denial of service (DoS),
whose purpose is to block communication, thereby forcing
network resources unavailable to its target users, i.e., packet
loss. In most previous studies (e.g., [15], [16]), packet loss was
always assumed to follow a probability distribution. In fact,
it is not feasible for a defender to assume that packet loss
caused by attackers follows a given probability distribution
[17]. With this in mind, the reference [17] proposed a general
attack model without any assumptions on the underlying attack
strategy, where the attacker action is only constrained through
the frequency and duration of DoS attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, most work based on the
DILOC algorithm is carried out in a perfect communication
environment [4]–[9]. It is of practical significance to analyze
the localization problem of wireless sensor networks under
DoS attacks, which is also the research motivation of this
paper. According to the general DoS attacks model proposed
in [17], we first uses a simulation example to show that
the classical DILOC algorithm may not achieve localization,
while the attackers can attack the communication network
in a changing active time period. Then, we propose a new
consensus-based distributed iterative localization algorithm
using an abandonment strategy, which is called the AS-DILOC
algorithm. By introducing the composition of binary relations
and casting the iteration of the AS-DILOC algorithm as a
convergence problem of the product of infinite sub-stochastic
matrices, we prove that the AS-DILOC algorithm converges
globally to the accurate locations of sensors in presence of
DoS attacks.
The outline of this paper is shown as follows. Section II
introduces some preliminary knowledge. Section III presents
the AS-DILOC algorithm under DoS attacks in detail. In Sec-
tion IV, the global convergence of the AS-DILOC algorithm
is theoretically proved. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N. In is an n-order
identity matrix. Let 0 be compatible dimensions of zeros, and
1 be an all 1’s column vector. M(i, :) denotes the ith row of
matrix M . det[M ] represents the determinant of matrix M .
For a nonnegative matrix M ∈ Rn×n, its infinite norm is
represented as ‖M‖∞ = max
{∑n
j=1 Mij : i = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
.
A nonnegative matrixM is row-stochastic ifM1 = 1, and it is
sub-stochastic if M1 ≤ 1. Let ∏sw=1Mw = MsMs−1 · · ·M1
represent the left products of matrices Mi, i = 1, 2, . . . , s.
Definition 1 ( [18]): The convex hull of the set X =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} is the minimum convex set containing all
points xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, represented by Co{X } =
{∑ni=1 aixi : ai ≥ 0,∑ni=1 ai = 1}.
B. Graph theory
Let G = {V , E } represent a digraph containing a node
set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and an arc set E . An arc with initial
node i and terminal node j is represented by (i, j). There are
no self-loops, namely, such arcs as (vi, vi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
A directed path from nodes i1 to iz in G is a finite non-
null edge sequence Pi1→iz = (i1, i2)(i2, i3) · · · (iz−1, iz), in
which i1, i2, . . . , iz ∈ V are different from each other. The
directed distance from i1 to iz is indicated as di1→iz , which
is the number of arcs in the shortest path from i1 to iz .
Definition 2 ( [19]): Let E1 and E2 be relations on a set
V . The composition of E1 and E2 is the relation consisting of
order pairs (b, d), where b, d ∈ V , and for which there exists
c ∈ V such that (b, c) ∈ E1 and (c, d) ∈ E2. The composition
of E1 and E2 is represented by E1 ◦ E2.
C. Barycentric coordinate representation
The barycentric coordinate describes the relative position of
a node relative to other nodes. For four nodes i, j, k, l in the
2-dimension Euclidean space, the coordinates are expressed
by pi, pj , pk, pl, respectively. The barycentric coordinates of
point i relative to j, k, l are aij , aik, ail, satisfying
pi = aijpj + aikpk + ailpl, (1)
where aij + aik + ail = 1. In particular, the barycentric
coordinates can be expressed as the ratio of regions between
specified triangles. For instance, in Fig. 1, the barycentric
coordinates are given by
aij =
S△ikl
S△jkl
, aik =
S△ilj
S△jkl
, ail =
S△ljk
S△jkl
,
where S△ikl, S△ilj , S△ljk, S△jkl are the areas of the cor-
responding triangles △ikl,△ilj,△ljk,△jkl, which can be
calculated with Euclidean distance measurements between
nodes by Cayley-Menger determinant [20], i.e.,
S2△ikl = −
1
16
det


0 1 1 1
1 0 d2ik d
2
il
1 d2ki 0 d
2
kl
1 d2li d
2
lk 0

 ,
in which dik, dil, dlk are Euclidean distance measurements
among nodes i, l, k.
Fig. 1. An example of node i lying in the convex hull of nodes j, k, l.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. DILOC algorithm
Consider a wireless sensor network with a node set Θ =
{1, 2, . . . , n} in the 2-dimension Euclidean space. A node is
called an anchor if its location is known, and a node is called
a sensor if its location is unknown and to be determined. As
shown in [4], at least three anchors that are not in a straight
line are necessary to locate any sensor with unknown location
in the 2-dimension Euclidean space. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we let Ξ={1, 2, 3} and Ω={4, 5, . . . , n} represent
the set of anchors and the set of sensors, respectively. The set
of the neighbors of node i in a given radius, µi, is
Φ(i, µi) = {r ∈ Θ : dri < µi},
which may include anchors as well as sensors. In the classical
DILOC algorithm, the following three deployment assump-
tions are required.
A1 The locations of all the sensors lie inside the convex hull
of the anchors, i.e., Co{Ω} ⊆ Co{Ξ}.
A2 For every sensor i ∈ Ω, there are some µi > 0 such that
a triangulation set, Ni ⊆ Φ(i, µi), satisfying |Ni| = 3
exists, where |Ni| is the number of the elements in Ni.
A3 For any sensor i ∈ Ω, there is a communication link
between all nodes in the set {i} ∪Ni.
Finding the triangulation set Ni is an important step in the
DILOC algorithm. Given the deployment density, sensor i can
set an initial communication radius µi to determine its neigh-
bor set Φ(i, µi). Then, sensor i selects any three neighbors in
Φ(i, µi) and tests whether it is located in the convex hull of
these neighbors. If all tests fail, sensor i adaptively increases
its communication radius in small increments. By repeating
this process, the triangulation set will be finally determined.
Let pa = [p1, p2, p3]
T and ps = [p4, p5, . . . , pn]
T be the
locations of anchors and sensors, respectively. According to
the representation of the barycentric coordinates of each node
relative to its neighbors, we get[
pa
ps
]
=
[
I3 0
F H
] [
pa
ps
]
, (2)
where there are three nonzero elements in each row of [F H ].
These are the barycentric coordinates of the nodes relative to
their neighbors. In addition, the matrix [F H ] is row-stochastic
and the block matrix H is sub-stochastic. In particular, the
row sums of matrix H satisfy: if the neighbor set Ni+3 of the
sensor i+3 contains anchors, where i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 3, then
∑n−3
j=1 Hij < 1, and if there are no anchors in Ni+3, then∑n−3
j=1 Hij = 1.
The iteration of the DILOC algorithm in [4] is written as
p˜i(t+ 1) =
∑
r∈Ni
airp˜r(t), i ∈ Ω, (3)
where p˜i(t) is the location estimate of sensor i at time t, and
air are the barycentric coordinates of sensor i relative to its
three neighbors in Ni. By the assumption A3, air are known
to sensor i. The iteration process (3) can also be computed in
another form [9], which can be written as
p˜i(t+1) = p˜i(t)+ γ
∑
r∈Ni
air
(
p˜r(t)− p˜i(t)
)
, i ∈ Ω, (4)
where γ is a constant. Obviously, (4) is a more general
form, which covers (3) as a special case of γ = 1. Define
p˜s(t) = [p˜4(t), p˜5(t), . . . , p˜n(t)]
T . Eq. (4) can be expressed
equivalently as the following compact form
p˜s(t+ 1) = γFpa +Qp˜s(t), (5)
where Q = (1 − γ)In−3 + γH . It has been shown in [4]–
[9] that the final location estimations of the sensors updating
through (4) or (5) are expressed as
lim
t→∞
p˜s(t)=[In−3−H ]−1Fpa, (6)
which is also the exact locations of the sensors. [In−3−H ]−1F
is the matrix of the barycentric coordinates of the sensors in
terms of the anchors.
Remark 1: For each sensor i, its three neighbors in Ni may
contain both anchors and other sensors. Sensor i can determine
its barycentric coordinates relative to its three neighbors in Ni
by measuring the Euclidean distance, thereby estimating its
own location. Because the locations of anchors are known,
sensor i can localize itself in one single step if its three
neighbors in Ni are all anchors. And if Ni contains location-
unknown sensors, sensor i’s one-step location estimation is not
its accurate location. The purpose of the DILOC algorithm
is to determine the final location estimation of sensor i
completely by the locations of anchors through distributed
iteration, so that accurate localization is achieved.
B. DoS attacks model
DoS attacks refer to a kind of attacks in which an attacker
controls some or all components of the system. DoS attacks
can affect the timeliness of information exchange, resulting in
a loss of data [17]. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
that the attacker can attack the communication network in
the changing active time period, which means the attacked
communication channels can neither be used for sending nor
receiving data. Next, the attacker needs to pause the attack
activity and move to sleep time to save energy for the next
attack.
Let {sk}k∈N, where s0 ≥ 0, represents the time sequence of
DoS attacks off/on conversion, i.e., the time instants when the
attacker launches DoS attacks. Specifically, the attack instant
sk and its dwell time ϕk determine the k-th active period of
DoS attacks, i.e., Sk := [sk, sk + ϕk], in which the attacker
attacks parts or all of the communication channels, and then
the information transmitted by the attacked channels will be
lost. If ϕk = 0, the k-th DoS takes the form of a single pulse
at time sk. Let
S =
⋃
k∈N
Sk, M = T\S (7)
represent a set of time instants where communication is denied
and allowed, respectively, where T = {t : t = 0, 1, 2 . . .} is
the set of all iteration time instants. To illustrate DoS attacks,
a simple example is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. An example of attack schedules.
C. Simulations by the DILOC algorithm under DoS attacks
In the DILOC algorithm, each sensor always uses the
received information from its neighbors to estimate the lo-
cation. In other words, when a part of the communication
links arriving at a certain sensor i are attacked, the sensor i
estimates its location by using the information received from
the remaining communication links. Define
N
D
i (t)=
{
j : j∈Ni and (j, i) is attacked at t∈S
}
. (8)
For any i ∈ Ω, the iteration form of the DILOC algorithm
under DoS attacks is written as
p˜i(t+1) =


p˜i(t) + γ
∑
r∈Ni\N
D
i
(t)
air
(
p˜r(t)− p˜i(t)
)
, t ∈ S,
p˜i(t) + γ
∑
r∈Ni
air
(
p˜r(t)− p˜i(t)
)
, t ∈M.
(9)
It is worth noting that the DILOC algorithm may not accu-
rately locate the sensors due to the diversity of attack strategies
of DoS, which are illustrated by the following example.
Example 1: Consider a sensor network consisting of seven
nodes, see Fig. 3, where the sets of anchors and sensors are
Ξ = {1, 2, 3} and Ω = {4, 5, 6, 7}, respectively. The locations
of anchors are p1 = (1,
√
3), p2 = (0, 0), p3 = (2, 0). The tri-
angulation sets are chosen as N4 = {2, 5, 7}, N5 = {3, 6, 7},
N6 = {1, 4, 7}, N7 = {4, 5, 6}. We can see that there are no
anchors in the sensor 7’s triangulation set, and there is only
one anchor in the triangulation sets of other sensors. Since
no sensors communicate directly with all anchors, all sensors
can not achieve accurate localization in one step. For each
sensor i ∈ Ω, its barycentric coordinates relative to its three
neighbors in the triangulation set Ni can be calculated by
using Euclidean distance among the nodes in the set {i}∪Ni
in the Cayley-Menger determinant. For example, we can use
the distances d74 = d75 = d76 =
√
3
3 , d45 = d46 = d5,6 = 1
to compute a74 = a75 = a76 =
1
3 . Let the gain parameter
be γ = 1/2 in Eq. (9). Suppose the attacker attacks at time
instants sk = 3k, k ∈ N, and the dwell time is ϕk = 1, k ∈ N.
We below consider two DoS attack strategies:
(I) The attacker attacks communication links (2, 4), (5, 4),
(7, 4) at time instants 3k, k ∈ N and communication
links (4, 7), (5, 7), (6, 7) at time instants 3k + 1, k ∈ N.
(II) The attacker attacks communication links (2, 4), (3, 5),
(6, 7) at time instants 3k, k ∈ N and communication
links (1, 6), (4, 7), (5, 7) at time instants 3k + 1, k ∈ N.
It can be observed from Fig. 4 that the DILOC algorithm can
precisely determine the locations of the sensors under attack
strategy (I), but not under attack strategy (II).
Fig. 3. A network consisting of seven nodes, where 1, 2, 3 and 4, 5, 6, 7
represent the anchors and the sensors, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Trajectories of the sensors’ location estimations obtained by the
DILOC algorithm under the DoS attack strategies (I) and (II).
Remark 2: As can be seen from Example 1, the DILOC
algorithm cannot achieve accurate sensor localization under
arbitrary attack strategy. In fact, the DILOC algorithm is only
effective for one kind of attack strategy, that is, the attacker
either attacks all three communication links to a node or does
not attack any communication link to the node. If the attacker
launches other attack strategies, the DILOC algorithm will fail.
In addition, the effectiveness of DoS attacks is independent of
the communication structure and initial location estimations.
D. AS-DILOC algorithm
In this paper, we propose a consensus-based distributed
iterative algorithm which can accurately locate sensors under
any DoS attack strategy under the deployment assumptions
A1−A3, where each node estimates its location by using an
abandonment-strategy rule. The proposed algorithm is shown
in Algorithm III-D.
Algorithm 1 AS-DILOC algorithm
1: Set the time sequence {sk}k∈N of DoS attacks off/on
conversion, dwell time ϕk, k ∈ N, and the initiate
location estimates p˜i(0), i = 1, 2, . . . , n;
2: For each location-unknown sensor i ∈ Ω, the following
update strategy is designed.
I) If sensor i can receive the neighbors’ information from
all three communication links arriving at itself, then the
following location estimate rule is designed:
p˜i(t+1)=(1− γ)p˜i(t)+γ
∑
r∈Ni
airp˜r(t), (10)
II) If sensor i detects that the information on at least one
communication link arriving at it is intercepted, then a
strategy of abandoning update is adopted, i.e.,
p˜i(t+1)= p˜i(t). (11)
3: Advance the time to t+ 1, then go to step 2.
Remark 3: In the DILOC algorithm (9), if some commu-
nication links arriving at node i are attacked by the attacker,
namely, node i cannot receive the neighbor information on
these communication links, then node i will use the neighbor
information received from the remaining communication links
to estimate its location. The difference between the AS-DILOC
algorithm and the classic DILOC algorithm is reflected in the
strategy of processing neighbor information when the sensor
network is attacked. For example, in the AS-DILOC algorithm,
even if only one communication link arriving at node i is
attacked, node i adopts a strategy of abandoning update, i.e.,
p˜i(t+ 1) = p˜i(t).
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
The global convergence of the AS-DILOC algorithm is an-
alyzed by using the sub-stochastic matrix and the composition
of binary relations.
We first convert Eqs. (10) and (11) to a matrix-vector form:
p˜s(t+1)=γF (t)pa+
[
In−3−γ
(
N(t)−H(t)g)]p˜s(t), (12)
where N(t) = diag{
∑
r
[F (t) H(t)]1r, . . . ,
∑
r
[F (t) H(t)]n−3,r},
[F (t) H(t)](i, :)=0, if t ∈ S,N Di (t) 6=∅,
[F (t) H(t)](i, :)=[F H ](i, :), if t ∈M or t∈S,N Di (t) 6=∅,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 3. Let Q(t) = In−3−γ
(
N(t) −H(t)),
then the solution of iterative process (12) can be written as
lim
t→∞
p˜s(t) =
∏∞
t=0
Q(t)p˜s(0) + lim
t→∞
Γ(t)pa, (13)
where Γ(t) = γF (t) + γ
∑t
j=1
∏t
i=j Q(i)F (j − 1).
We observe from (5) that the final location estimations of
the sensors are located in the convex hull of the anchors and
linearly represented by the locations of the anchors. Therefore,
the following equation should be proved first∏∞
t=0
Q(t) = 0. (14)
Furthermore, in order to ensure that the final location estima-
tions of sensors are the same with the accurate locations, it is
also necessary to prove that
lim
t→∞
Γ(t) =[In−3−H ]−1F. (15)
Our next major task is to give detailed proofs of Eqs. (14) and
(15), respectively. Before proceeding, we construct a digraph
G [M(t)] =
{
V [M(t)], E [M(t)]
}
, t ∈ N, where
M(t) =
[
1 0
γF (t)1 Q(t)
]
is the corresponding weighted adjacency matrix, V [M(t)] =
{0, 1, . . . , n − 3} is the node set in which the elements are
the row indexes of matrix M(t) except the first one which is
labeled as 0, and E [M(t)] is the set of arcs.
We first present the result of directed edges composition to
prove Eqs. (14) and (15).
Theorem 1: Consider the AS-DILOC algorithm. Under the
deployment assumptions A1 − A3, if the parameter γ is
selected within the interval (0, 1), then for any time intervals
[sk, sk+P ), k ∈ N, where P =max{di→j : i∈Ξ, j ∈Ω}, we
have
(0, i)∈E [M(sk)]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+P−1)], (16)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 3.
Proof: The communication links among the nodes are
described by a digraph G . It is known from [9] that there is
a directed path from the anchor set to each location-unknown
sensor in the digraph G under the assumptions A1 − A3.
Assume that the directed path from the anchors set Ξ to each
sensor iz+3 is described as Pa→iz+3=(a, i1+3), (i1+3, i2+
3), . . . , (iz−1+3, iz+3), where a ∈ Ξ and i1+3, i2+3, . . . , iz+
3 ∈ Ω with i1, i2, . . . , iz ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 3}.
We first consider the arc (a, i1 + 3) and the time interval
[sk, sk+1). Since the communication channels reaching node
i1 + 3 may be attacked in the interval [sk, sk + ϕk), so the
arc (a, i1 + 3) may not belong to the digraph G at time t ∈
[sk, sk+ϕk). And since [sk+ϕk, sk+1) is the dormant period
of nodes, node i1+3 can get information about all its neighbors
at any t ∈ [sk + ϕk, sk+1). According to the definition of
[F (t) H(t)], we can get
∑
j [H(sk+ϕk)]i1j < 1, equivalently,∑
j [Q(mδ+Td)]i1j < 1. This implies that (0, i1) ∈ E [M(mδ+
Td)]. Furthermore, it can be observed that the row-stochastic
matrix M(t) has diagonal elements under the condition 0 <
γ < 1, namely, the digraph G [M(t)] has self-loops on all
nodes 0, 1, . . . , n− 3. Consequently,
(0, i1) ∈ E
[
M(sk)
] ◦ · · · ◦ E [M(sk+1−1)], (17)
where (0, 0) ∈ E [M(sk)], . . . , (0, 0) ∈ E [M(sk + ϕk −
1)], (0, i1) ∈ E [M(sk + ϕk)], (i1, i1) ∈ E [M(sk + ϕk +
1)], . . . , (i1, i1)∈E [M(sk+1−1)].
Consider the arc (ir +3, ir+1+3) and the attack period
[sk+r, sk+r+1), where r = 1, 2, . . . , z − 1. Obviously, each
node can get information about all its neighbors during the
dormant period [sk+r+ϕk+r, sk+r+1). From the definition of
[F (t) H(t)], we have [H(sk+r+ϕk+r)]ir+1ir > 0, and further
[Q(sk+r +ϕk+r)]ir+1ir > 0. This means that (ir, ir+1) ∈
E [M(sk+r+ϕk+r)]. It thus follows that
(ir, ir+1)∈E
[
M(sk+r)
]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+r+1−1)], (18)
where (ir, ir) ∈ E [M(sk+r)], . . . , (ir, ir) ∈ E [M(sk+r +
ϕk+r − 1)], (ir, ir+1) ∈ E [M(sk+r + ϕk+r)], (ir+1, ir+1) ∈
E [M(sk+r+ϕk+r+1)], . . . , (ir+1, ir+1)∈E [M(sk+r+1−1)].
Combining (17) and (18), it can be obtained that
(0, iz)∈E
[
M(sk)
]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+z−1)], (19)
where z is the length of the path Pa→iz+3 and it satisfies
z ≤ P . In addition, the fact that the nodes have self-loops in
the digraph G [M(t)], t ∈ N guarantees that
(iz, iz)∈E
[
M(sk+z)
]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+P−1)]. (20)
By (17) and (20), we have
(0, iz)∈E
[
M(sk)
]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+P−1)]. (21)
Equivalently, we have (0, i) ∈ E [M(sk)]◦· · ·◦E [M(sk+P−1)]
for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 3.
Based on the conclusion of Theorem 1, we analyze Eq. (14)
and Eq. (15) in detail in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Under the deployment assumptions A1−A3,
if the parameter γ is selected within the interval (0, 1), then
Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) can be derived, that is, the AS-DILOC
algorithm can converge to the exact sensor locations under
DoS attacks.
Proof: For any time interval [smP , s(m+1)P ), where
m ∈ N, we know from Theorem 1 that (0, i) ∈ E [M(smP )] ◦
· · · ◦ E [M(s(m+1)P − 1)], i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 3. Let δm denote
the number of time instants in the interval [smP , s(m+1)P ).
According to Definition 2, there are a series of nodes
i1, i2, . . . , iδ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 3} such that (0, i1) ∈
E [M(smP )], (i1, i2) ∈ E [M(smP + 1)], . . . , (iδm−1, iδm) ∈
E [M(s(m+1)P−1)], where iδm = i and there may be duplicate
elements in the nodes set {i1, i2, . . . , iδm}.
Below we analyze the matrices product
∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP Q(t)
associated with the interval [smP , s(m+1)P ). Define
σ = min
{
γair, 1− γ
∑
r∈Ni
air : i, r = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
, (22)
then all elements of M(t) are greater than or equal to σ. By
(0, i1) ∈ E [M(smP )], we have [γF1]i1 ≥ σ, it follows that∑n−3
j=1
[Q(smP )]i1j = 1− [γF1]i1 ≤ 1− σ < 1. (23)
For any q = 1, 2, . . . , δm − 1, since (iq, iq+1) ∈ E [M(smP +
q)], we get [Q(smP + q)]iq+1iq ≥ σ. It thus follows that
[∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP+1
Q(t)
]
iδm i1
≥
[
Q(s(m+1)P−1)
]
iδm iδm−1
· · ·
[
Q(smP+1)
]
i2i1
≥σδm−1. (24)
Combining with (23) and (24), we can further deduce that
n−3∑
j=1
[∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP
Q(t)
]
iδm j
=
n−3∑
j1=1
j1 6=i1
[∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP+1
Q(t)
]
iδm j1
n−3∑
j=1
[Q(smP )]j1j
+
[∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP+1
Q(t)
]
iδm i1
n−3∑
j=1
[Q(smP )]i1j
≤ (1− σδm−1) + σδm−1(1− σ) = 1− σδm < 1. (25)
Equivalently, we have∥∥∥∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP
Q(t)
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1− σδm ≤ 1− σδˆ < 1 (26)
for anym ∈ N, where δˆ = max{δm : m ∈ N}. Consequently,
∥∥∥
∏∞
t=0
Q(i)
∥∥∥
∞
≤
∏∞
m=0
∥∥∥
∏s(m+1)P−1
t=smP
Q(t)
∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥
∏s0−1
t=0
Q(t)
∥∥∥
∞
≤ lim
m→∞
(
1− σδˆ
)m
= 0. (27)
This guarantees the establishment of Eq. (14).
In the DILOC algorithm, it has been proved that the matrix
H is invertible if there is a directed path from the anchors set
to each location-unknown sensor, thus (In−3−H)−1 exists.
According to the definitions F (t) and Q(t), we deduce that(
In−3−Q(t)
)
(In−3−H)−1F =γF (t). (28)
By substituting (28) into Γ(t), we obtain that
lim
t→∞
Γ(t)= lim
t→∞
( t∑
i=0
Q(t)· · ·Q(i+1)
(
In−3−Q(i)
))
(In−3−H)
−1
F
= lim
t→∞
(
In−3 −Q(t)Q(t− 1) · · ·Q(0)
)
(In−3−H)
−1
F
=(In−3−H)
−1
F. (29)
This also means that (15) is established.
Example 2: Consider a sensor network consisting of the
anchor set Ξ = {1, 2, 3} and the sensor set Ω = {4, 5, 6, 7}
in the 2-dimensional Euclidean space. The triangulation sets
and location coordinates of the sensors are set the same as
Example 1. Let the gain parameter be γ = 1/2 in Eq. (10).
It can be observed from Fig. 5 that the AS-DILOC algorithm
can precisely determine the locations of the sensors whether
under attack strategies (I) or (II) considered in Example 1.
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of the sensors’ location estimates obtained by the AS-
DILOC algorithm under the DoS attack strategies (I) and (II) in Example
1.
Remark 4: The main contribution of this paper is to propose
an AS-DILOC algorithm based on barycentric coordinates
measurement in the situation of DoS attacks. We show through
Example 1 that the DILOC algorithm may fail when the
attacker changes the attack strategy. We prove that the AS-
DILOC algorithm proposed in this paper can achieve accurate
sensor localizations under arbitrary attack strategy, which is
illustrated by Example 2.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of determining the sensors locations in the
presence of DoS attacks has been studied in this paper.
The AS-DILOC algorithm has been proposed based on the
barycentric coordinates which only involve relative distance
measurement. The global convergence of the AS-DILOC
algorithm has been analyzed by using the sub-stochastic
matrix and the composition of binary relations. Moreover, the
effectiveness of the AS-DILOC algorithm under DoS attacks
has been verified by a simulation example.
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